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When is a bribe not a bribe? A surprisingly large number 
of times under current New Zealand law. So many, in 
fact, that its outdated legislation has regularly been cited 
as a key reason why, despite its deserved reputation for 
good governance, New Zealand remains one of very few 
signatories to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) that has yet to ratify it, alongside Syria, 
Bhutan, Barbados and Japan.1 The Organised Crime and 
Anti-corruption Legislation Bill (OCACL Bill) is explicitly 
designed to change this state of affairs. As stated by Amy 
Adams, the minister of justice: 
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A range of amendments in the bill 
will also strengthen New Zealand’s 
ability to combat bribery and 
corruption. These will enable the 
Government to ratify the United 
Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, which is the first global 
instrument to address corruption in 
both the public and private spheres. 
(Adams, 2015)
An omnibus bill, which was introduced 
on 25 June 2015 after a second reading in 
May, the OCACL Bill makes amendments 
to 12 other acts and covers such subjects 
as money laundering, drug trafficking 
and people trafficking. There is no doubt 
that it does many good things and it is 
broadly to be welcomed. Yet in terms of 
bribery and corruption it leaves loopholes 
that not only potentially damage New 
Zealand but are inconsistent with the 
professed desire to ratify UNCAC.
This article will briefly review what the 
changes to the legislation are in terms of 
bribery and corruption, and will focus on 
the arguments surrounding a remaining 
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loophole which potentially offers a legal 
defence for bribery of a foreign public 
official. It will suggest that the existence 
of this defence is not only wrong in and 
of itself, it is also potentially counter-
productive towards the aim of ratifying 
UNCAC. It will then discuss two other 
areas of interest that raise questions 
that are still to be answered: the role of 
politically exposed persons and trading 
in influence.
The catastrophic yet frequently 
unacknowledged effects of corruption 
have been noted on many occasions. A 
study in the UK observed that, whereas 
some illegal activities get far more 
attention in the media, such as terrorism, 
they actually devastate far fewer lives 
(and kill fewer people) than corruption 
(Transparency International UK, 2011).2 
The classic case against the manifold 
threats of bribery is well rehearsed:
The effects of corruption on society 
are well documented. Politically it 
represents an obstacle to democracy 
and the rule of law; economically 
it depletes a country’s wealth, often 
diverting it to corrupt officials’ 
pockets and, at its core, it puts an 
imbalance in the way that business 
is done, enabling those who practise 
corruption to win. The language of 
bribery also deceives, implying that 
what is being offered or expected is 
of no consequence. But corruption 
is not a victimless crime; it leads to 
decisions being made for the wrong 
reasons. Contracts are awarded 
because of kickbacks and not 
whether they are the best value for 
the community. Corruption costs 
people freedom, health and human 
rights and, in the worst cases, their 
lives (Kemp, 2014).
In terms of business alone, the 
World Bank estimates that corruption 
costs approximately US$1 trillion per 
year globally. Doing business in corrupt 
markets has been found to add costs 
equivalent to a 20% tax on business, 
with an additional 25% of the cost of 
procurement contracts in developing 
countries. Firms that win contracts by 
paying bribes have been found to under-
perform for up to three years before and 
after winning the contract for which the 
bribe was paid. Firms that bribe are fixated 
on sales growth, not on maximising 
shareholder value. The higher the rank of 
person bribed, the lower the benefit firms 
receive, while the size of the bribe more 
than offsets the value of the contract to 
the firm (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis, 
2011).
Bribery also has a negative effect on 
business morale. Healy and Serafeim 
(2015) argue that there are a number of 
factors that can adversely affect workers’ 
morale once corruption has been 
discovered. First, it is important to note 
who may be involved in the act of bribery 
itself; the more senior the person, the 
more negative the impact on workforce 
morale. Second, who discovered and 
reported the incident is also important; 
there is a correlation between being 
discovered by front-line staff and the 
way people subsequently feel about the 
action. Most important of all, however, is 
the reaction of the firm upon uncovering 
corruption and bribery. Cases in which 
the main perpetrator is dismissed are 
less likely to be associated with a negative 
impact on firm competitiveness. 
Of all these variables, however, by 
far the least important is the size of 
the bribe: ‘Size does not matter when it 
comes to bribery … Small or big bribing 
is bad business in the long term’ (ibid.). 
In short, any size bribe has a detrimental 
impact.
Corruption and bribery legislation in  
New Zealand: the Crimes Act 1961
There are a number of pieces of 
legislation that currently touch upon 
aspects of bribery and corruption, 
including the Serious Fraud Office Act 
1990, the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) 
Act 2009, the Protected Disclosures Act 
2000, the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 
2009, the Commerce Act 1986 and the 
Local Authorities (Members’ Interests) 
Act 1968. New Zealand is also subject to 
extra-territorial legislation, notably the 
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
UK Bribery Act 2010. Of chief importance, 
however, are two pieces of legislation: the 
Secret Commissions Act 1910, which deals 
primarily with private sector corruption, 
and the Crimes Act 1961, which outlines 
offences against public officials and which 
we will primarily focus on here. 
The Crimes Act 1961 creates specific 
offences of bribery and corruption of: 
judicial officers (section 101); minister 
(section 102); members of Parliament 
(section 103); law enforcement officers 
(section 104); public officials, including 
local government officials and members 
of other public bodies (section 105 and, 
specifically the corrupt use of official 
information, sections 105A and105B), 
and foreign officials (sections 105C and 
105D). In terms of domestic bribery the 
law is unequivocal: a bribe is defined 
as ‘any money, valuable consideration, 
office, or employment, or any benefit, 
whether direct or indirect’ (section 99). 
There are no exceptions or grey areas. 
Sentences are also prohibitive, with 
maximum imprisonment of either seven 
or 14 years depending on the offence. 
In all cases prosecutions can proceed 
only with the express permission of the 
attorney-general (section 106(1)).
Bribery of foreign officials, however, 
is somewhat more complex. The Crimes 
Act was already the subject of a number 
of amendments for bribery of foreign 
officials, which was to bring legislation 
into line with the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials (Newman and Macaulay, 2013). 
‘Size does not matter when it comes to 
bribery … Small or big bribing is bad 
business in the long term’ (ibid.). In 
short, any size bribe has a detrimental 
impact
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Incidentally, the OECD convention was 
invoked in Parliament in May 2015 
during questions on the gifting of $6 
million of livestock and farm equipment 
to Saudi Arabian businessman Hamood 
Al Ali Khalaf, allegedly as an inducement 
for expediting the free trade agreement 
(Parker, 2015). Even taking these into 
account, though, a number of loopholes 
remained which provided two separate 
defences for bribery and corruption.
Section 105E states that an offence 
only occurs if it:
(a)was done outside New Zealand; 
and
(b)was not, at the time of its 
commission, an offence under 
the laws of the foreign country 
in which the principal office of 
the person, organisation, or other 
body for whom the foreign public 
official is employed or otherwise 
provides services, is situated.
Section 105C.3 also allows for a 
defence of bribery, if:
(a) the act that is alleged to 
constitute the offence was 
committed for the sole or 
primary purpose of ensuring or 
expediting the performance by a 
foreign public official of a routine 
government action; and
(b) the value of the benefit is small.
This second defence applies to what is 
commonly known as ‘facilitation payments’ 
or ‘grease money’. Clearly it would have no 
bearing on a case such as the one above; 
but it would apply to payments that are 
designed to speed up a service or move one 
to the front of a queue. They are frequently 
justified as essential for doing business 
in jurisdictions where such payments 
are widely accepted, if not the norm. 
Furthermore, it is argued that not engaging 
in such payments can lead to a diminution 
of competitive advantage: criminalising 
small-scale bribes would be bad for New 
Zealand business. Such a view is challenged, 
as has been shown, by empirical research, 
but, nonetheless, how has the OCACL Bill 
responded to these challenges?
Bribery of foreign public officials
There is no question that the OCACL Bill 
makes substantial ground in bolstering 
legislation: for example, increasing the 
sentencing for private corruption under 
the Secret Commission Act 1910 to 
imprisonment for up to seven years. In 
addition, the Crimes Act has undeniably 
been strengthened. One major 
development in terms of the Crimes Act 
is that the ‘national law’ defence of section 
105E has now been dropped altogether. 
It is no longer relevant whether or not a 
corrupt act is legal in another jurisdiction; 
from now on it will be illegal under New 
Zealand law. 
There are still some areas, however, 
that are open to debate. The first is 
that the defence of bribery of foreign 
officials in section 105C.3 remains 
unchanged. This clause was challenged 
by three different submissions to the 
law and order select committee (from 
the Institute for Governance and Policy 
Studies, Transparency International 
New Zealand and the Human Rights 
Commission) and was also the subject of 
a supplementary order paper by Green 
MP David Clendon which asked for its 
removal (Clendon, 2015). 
UNCAC’s wording is unequivocal: 
bribery is not acceptable no matter how 
large or small the value, or where the 
jurisdiction may be. It is as clear for 
domestic bribery as it is for overseas 
bribery (see Box 1).
During the first reading debate the 
defence in section 105C.3 was explicitly 
linked to the facilitation payments and 
was addressed by, among others, Amy 
Adams:
A final amendment to the foreign 
bribery offence addresses the existing 
exception for small payments made 
to foreign public officials for the sole 
purpose of expediting a service to 
which the payer is already entitled, 
commonly known as facilitation 
payments. It is important to note 
that this exception has been part 
of our law for many years and 
is important to ensure that New 
Zealanders acting in good faith are 
not unintentionally criminalised … 
I note that this is consistent with 
the treatment of such facilitation 
payments in Australia, in the US, and 
in South Korea, and with operational 
practice in the UK. (Adams, 2014)
This is an interesting response for 
a number of reasons. The reference 
to ‘operational practice in the UK’ is 
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Box 1: Article 16, UNCAC
Article 16. Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organizations
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, 
the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a 
public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advan-
tage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order 
that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in 
relation to the conduct of international business.
2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other mea-
sures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when com-
mitted intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official 
or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of 
an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of 
his or her official duties.
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perhaps a little disingenuous. Such bribes 
are illegal under UK law, and always 
have been; long before the advent of the 
Bribery Act 2010, in fact. It is true that 
the director of public prosecutions has 
provided guidance to suggest that it is 
unlikely that an individual or company 
would be prosecuted for low-value 
facilitation payments, but this would 
apply equally to New Zealand anyway, 
which requires the assent of the attorney-
general for all bribery prosecutions. 
There is a distinction between making 
a judgement call on a case-by-case 
basis, and a legal defence that is backed 
by legislation, which, under the new 
provisions of the OCACL Bill, has been 
blurred. 
Similarly, the reference to other 
jurisdictions is not entirely accurate. 
While it is true that the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act allows facilitation 
payments, the US has come under 
substantial pressure, particularly from the 
OECD, to close that loophole. Australia 
has been repeatedly criticised by both 
the OECD and the UN for its stance on 
facilitation payments: in the UN’s review 
of Australia’s commitment to UNCAC in 
2012, for example, there was substantial 
criticism and an express call for a review 
of its policy on facilitation payments. 
The UN’s position was restated yet again 
during the fifth session of the Conference 
of the States Parties to the Convention 
(November 2013), which states: ‘It is 
a different matter if the national law 
extends only to ‘bribes’, leaving facilitation 
payments outside the scope of criminal 
liability … In such cases the State party 
clearly falls short of fulfilling Convention 
requirements’ (emphasis added).3 It is also 
worth stating that other countries have 
recently altered their own legislation. 
In 2013, for example, the Canadian 
parliament passed an act to amend the 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials 
Act to remove facilitation payments as a 
defence.
The OCACL Bill does, however, tackle 
facilitation payments in a different way. 
As the minister of justice suggests, one 
of the ways that facilitation payments 
will now be dealt with is through greater 
transparency. The bill amends section 
194 of the Companies Act, which now 
‘requires companies to keep a record of 
transactions that constitute acts of the 
kind described in section 105C(3) of the 
Crimes Act 1961’. In other words, as long 
as they are suitably recorded, small bribes 
of overseas officials will be permissible.
In addition, the facilitation payments 
issue has been addressed by changing the 
definition of routine government action 
in section 105C.1 to:
 (c) any action that provides –
(i) an undue material benefit to a 
person who makes a payment; or
(ii) an undue material disadvantage 
to any other person.
Amending the definition of routine 
government action to include ‘an undue 
material disadvantage’ has twice been 
identified as the means by which the 
Crimes Act now facilitates ratification 
of UNCAC. The Ministry of Justice 
offered the following justification in 
the select committee report,4 and Amy 
Adams repeated it during her speech to 
Parliament: 
The bill tightens this already narrow 
exception, such that it will not now 
apply to payments that provide an 
undue material advantage to the 
payer or an undue disadvantage 
to anyone else. This maintains 
compliance with the UN convention, 
which requires parties to criminalise 
payments that provide the recipient 
with an undue advantage (Adams, 
2014, emphasis added). 
These words are worth unpicking 
a little further. Arguably, Adams’ 
explanation rests on an extremely 
narrow reading of UNCAC, relying on 
the minutiae rather than the overall 
message. It bears restating that UNCAC 
does not allow any forms of bribery at 
all. None. Indeed, this is one key reason 
why the convention does not use the 
words ‘facilitation payments’ anywhere 
in its text; it does not make distinctions 
between different types of bribes.
Nonetheless, articles 15 (bribery of 
national public officials) and 16 (bribery 
of foreign public officials and officials of 
public international organisations) both 
explicitly refer to an official acting, or 
refraining from acting, ‘in the exercise 
of his or her official duties’. It does not 
distinguish between ‘routine government 
actions’ and other types of action. The 
OCACL Bill clause, therefore, regarding 
whether or not it offers an advantage 
or disadvantage is largely immaterial. In 
addition, however, if a ‘routine government 
action’ is defined as one that does not 
confer an advantage, then defence under 
section 105C.3 is now redundant. What 
else can ‘expediting a routine government 
action’ possibly mean, other than to 
confer this advantage? The simplest and 
most elegant solution would have been 
to remove 105C.3 (a) and (b) from the 
Crimes Act.
Besides which, removing any further 
doubt around bribery is something that 
New Zealand should be leading the way in. 
It’s just the right thing to do. A facilitation 
payment is still a bribe no matter how 
small the amount, and such payments 
inculcate a culture of corruption. Given 
New Zealand’s leadership in the field of 
ethics and integrity, and also its deserved 
global reputation for anti-corruption, 
... New Zealand’s leadership in the 
field of ethics and integrity, and also 
its deserved global reputation for anti-
corruption, it seems anomalous that we 
would wish to leave such a loophole in 
place.
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it seems anomalous that we would wish 
to leave such a loophole in place. The 
Serious Fraud Office (in partnership with 
Transparency International New Zealand 
and other organisations) now provides 
anti-bribery and corruption training for 
businesses operating abroad. It is notable 
that the training suggests that, as good 
practice, facilitation payments should 
not be paid. Removing clause 105C.3 
would simply formalise in law this good 
practice.
There seems to be a somewhat Janus-
faced view of the problem. The OCACL 
Bill offers two solutions to a problem that 
it suggests is not a big issue. Ironically, 
both of these solutions still go up against 
the wording and spirit of the relevant 
sections of UNCAC. 
Politically exposed persons
Another area in which the OCACL Bill 
seeks to enact greater affinity with UNCAC 
is money laundering. The explanatory 
note to the Organised Crime and Anti-
corruption Legislation Bill states, inter 
alia, that:
The Bill also contains amendments 
to enhance New Zealand’s anti-
corruption legislative frameworks 
and bring New Zealand into line 
with international best practice as set 
by the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption … The Bill is 
intended to ensure New Zealand’s full 
compliance with the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, 
while taking into account the existing 
legislative framework and the extent 
to which obligations under that 
Convention can be met through non-
legislative means. 
One area that has potentially been 
overlooked, however, is that of ‘politically 
exposed persons’. Legislation on politically 
exposed persons is found in section 26 of 
New Zealand’s Anti-Money Laundering 
and Countering Financing of Terrorism 
Act 2009, which states that:
(1) The reporting entity must, as soon 
as practicable after establishing a 
business relationship or conducting 
an occasional transaction, take 
reasonable steps to determine 
whether the customer or any 
beneficial owner is a politically 
exposed person.
(2) If a reporting entity determines that 
a customer or beneficial owner with 
whom it has established a business 
relationship is a politically exposed 
person, then –
(a) the reporting entity must have 
senior management approval 
for continuing the business 
relationship; and
(b) the reporting entity must obtain 
information about the source of 
wealth or funds of the customer 
or beneficial owner and take 
reasonable steps to verify the 
source of that wealth or those 
funds.
(3) If a reporting entity determines 
that a customer or beneficial owner 
with whom it has conducted an 
occasional transaction is a politically 
exposed person, then the reporting 
entity must, as soon as practicable 
after conducting that transaction, 
take reasonable steps to obtain 
information about the source of 
wealth or funds of the customer 
or beneficial owner and verify the 
source of that wealth or those funds.
But who exactly counts as a politically 
exposed person? In the New Zealand 
legislation a politically exposed person 
is defined as ‘an individual who holds, 
or has held at any time in the preceding 
12 months, in any overseas country 
[emphasis added] the prominent public 
function of ’ – and these are listed. 
Anti-money laundering legislation on 
politically exposed persons, therefore, 
only applies to persons who have held 
positions outside the country. It does not 
apply domestically. Again, this stands in 
opposition to UNCAC (see Box 2). 
Thus, UNCAC makes no distinction 
between foreign or domestic politically 
exposed persons (although, notably, it 
does not use the term politically exposed 
person directly, unlike the New Zealand 
legislation). The new OCACL Bill does 
not update legislation around politically 
exposed persons at all, and therefore, 
again, a number of questions emerge. 
Does the OCACL Bill in fact satisfy the 
requirements as stated in article 52 (1) 
of UNCAC? As this article does not 
distinguish between foreign and domestic 
politically exposed persons, it must apply 
to both. And yet the bill says nothing 
about politically exposed persons, 
unlike the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Countering Financing of Terrorism Act, 
which, however, applies only to foreign 
politically exposed persons. We recall 
that the foreign affairs, defence and 
trade select committee was of the view 
in 2009 that in regard to the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering Financing 
of Terrorism Bill, existing legislation was 
Box 2: Article 52 (1), UNCAC
Article 52: Prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime
(1) … each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in ac-
cordance with its domestic law, to require banks within its jurisdiction to 
verify the identity of customers, to take reasonable steps to determine the 
identity of beneficial owners of funds deposited into high-value accounts 
and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or 
on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent 
public functions and their family members and associates. Such enhanced 
scrutiny shall be reasonably designed to detect suspicious transactions for 
the purposes of reporting to competent authorities and should not be so 
construed as to discourage or prohibit banks from doing business with any 
legitimate customer [emphasis added].
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sufficient to cover domestic politically 
exposed persons. 
As with facilitation payments, there 
still seems to be a disconcerting attitude 
that offences in other jurisdictions are 
not the same as in New Zealand itself. 
And also, there are still gaps in New 
Zealand’s laws that may yet prevent it 
from ratifying the UNCAC. 
Trading in influence
One area where there has been, however, 
a clear and concerted effort to fulfil New 
Zealand’s UNCAC obligations is the 
addition of a new offence of trading in 
influence. The new Crimes Act, section 
105F states:
Every person is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 7 years who corruptly 
accepts or obtains, or agrees or offers 
to accept or attempts to obtain, a 
bribe for that person or another 
person with intent to influence 
an official in respect of any act 
or omission by that official in the 
official’s official capacity (whether or 
not the act or omission is within the 
scope of the official’s authority).
Introducing such an offence is a very 
forward-thinking approach and one that 
clearly brings New Zealand legislation 
into line with UNCAC (see Box 3).
The creation of this new law is really 
quite remarkable. There is no equivalent 
in, for example, the UK legislation, 
which is often touted as the world’s 
most comprehensive and punitive anti-
corruption legislation (see Newman and 
Macaulay, 2013). Indeed, as recently as 
February 2015 Transparency International 
UK called for just such a law to be made 
(Transparency International UK, 2015). 
Not only is the new offence admirably 
succinct; it also refuses to distinguish 
between domestic and overseas 
jurisdictions. The explanatory note to 
the bill simply states that: ‘New section 
105F sets out an offence for trading in 
influence. The penalty is imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 7 years.’ Perhaps 
most remarkable, however, is that trading 
in influence (often referred to as ‘influence 
marketing’) has long been identified as 
the most common form of corruption 
in developed Western economies. Indeed, 
Michael Johnston (2006) has labelled 
trading in influence as one of the four 
‘syndromes of corruption’ that describe 
and explain corrupt practices in different 
jurisdictions around the world. 
New Zealand obviously prides itself 
on its reputation for integrity and a 
lack of corruption. Our arguements do 
not seek to diminish that. However, it 
is fair to suggest, using research such as 
Transparency International New Zealand’s 
2013 National Integrity System study, that 
there are problems around ‘grey areas’: 
party funding; patronage; perceived 
nepotism and/or cronysim; unresolved 
conflicts of interest; misuse of lobbying, 
etc. (See Transparency Internatonal 
New Zealand, 2013). These problems 
are not dissimilar to those found in the 
US or continental Europe: they are the 
problems of access versus influence. This 
was one reason why the Transparency 
International study also suggested that the 
time may be ripe to consider introducing 
in New Zealand the common law offence 
of misconduct in public office, as exists 
in Britain and Hong Kong.5 This law 
covers corruption offences that are not as 
serious as those covered in statutory law, 
but which fall within some of these ‘grey 
areas’ of official behaviour. Arguably, the 
new law of trading in influence goes far 
beyond this.
It is usually clear who has access to 
politicians and decision-makers; what is 
less clear is whether or not this access 
garners any influence. To use the UK 
as an example, the Conservative Party 
‘Leader’s Group’ allows members direct 
meetings and engagements with the 
prime minister for an annual fee of 
£50,000.6 The group is fairly transparent 
and lists its donors/members for all to 
see.7 What is never clear, though, is the 
extent to which this access ever becomes 
translated into something more tangible. 
It is clear that the Leader’s Group 
donated £43 million to the Conservative 
Party during 2012–2014 alone, which, 
of course, may be dwarfed by donations 
in the US, for example, but in terms 
of UK party funding represents a 
substantial sum (Graham, 2014). Earlier 
in 2015 a study from Oxford University 
demonstrated a more worrying trend. 
Confirming what many suspected, it 
showed conclusively a link between party 
donations and peerages: that is, a seat in 
the House of Lords. These are no mere 
vanity appointments; party donations 
are buying people a seat at the legislative 
table (Mell, Radford and Thévoz, 2015).
Box 3: Article 18, UNCAC
Article 18. Trading in influence
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intention-
ally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official 
or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to 
obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an 
undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other  
person;
 (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for an-
other person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her 
real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration 
or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage.
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Without a second chamber this is 
something that does not of course affect 
New Zealand. Yet cash for honours is 
an issue that continues to raise its head. 
There is also a New Zealand equivalent 
of the Leader’s Group: the Cabinet 
Club. Although this has been dismissed 
as giving ‘no suggestion of cash for 
access’ (Bill English quoted in O’Brien, 
2014), there is an obvious concern that 
anonymous donations can grant a person 
direct contact (however innocent) with a 
member of the government.
This article is not seeking to 
cast judgement on current political 
arrangements. The point is a much 
broader one. To put it starkly, most of our 
political institutions and processes rely to 
some degree or other on influence, not 
necessarily in the sense of a secret society 
or a tap on the shoulder, but through 
the political infrastructure in which 
we operate: for instance, the lobbying 
industry and the corporate hospitality 
sector. These are vital components of 
our democracy, but it is undeniable that 
they work on the principle of the buying 
and selling of access and influence. The 
extent to which the new offence has been 
created through legislative logic, to meet 
the requirements of the UN convention, 
rather than with any serious consideration 
to future prosecutions is open to debate.
If nothing else, though, it is to be 
hoped that this new provision in the 
OCACL Bill will reactivate much-needed 
discussions about how such agencies 
can enhance democracy rather than 
potentially restrict it.
Conclusion
While there is much to admire in the new 
Organised Crime and Anti-corruption 
Legislation Bill, there are still some areas 
that have been left open-ended. Despite 
its highly progressive nature, it is difficult 
to foresee any prosecutions for trading in 
influence in the near future, not without 
some serious public debate first. Parts 
of the OCACL Bill are contradictory: 
for example, the maintenance of the 
defence for facilitation payments while 
the definition of ‘routine government 
business’ has been altered. Other sections 
seem to rub up against the stated aim 
of ratifying the UN Convention against 
Corruption. Legislation on politically 
exposed persons still does not correspond 
to the requisite article. There remains 
a loophole for overseas bribery, albeit 
a relatively small one. 
In both cases changes to the legislation 
would have been easy to make, although 
perhaps not so easy to enforce. All that 
needed to be done was to delete section 
105C.3 from the Crimes Act and to alter 
the definition of a politically exposed 
person in the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Countering Financing of Terrorism 
Act 2009 to: ‘an individual who holds, or 
has held at any time in the preceding 12 
months, the prominent public function 
of ’. Two small changes, but both with 
significant meaning.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect, 
however, is that New Zealand probably 
will shortly ratify UNCAC. Herein lies 
the biggest implication of all: not for 
our country, but for the world. Looking 
at those who have already ratified the 
convention, it is clear that many countries 
are beset with problems of corruption, far 
more than New Zealand, in fact. Which 
raises the question: what is the true value 
of UNCAC and other such agreements? 
Yet it is easy for healthy scepticism to 
deteriorate into outright cynicism, and 
easier still to decry imperfect solutions to 
agonisingly complex problems. 
The point of UNCAC is to provide 
commitment to, and a platform by 
which nations can share, a common 
vision and approach; implementing 
such will continue to take a long time. 
While one of the explicit ends of the new 
Organised Crime and Anti-corruption 
Legislation Bill is to allow ratification of 
UNCAC, this really should be secondary 
to improving legislation and providing 
international leadership in this area. The 
new amendments contained in the bill do 
make legislation more robust, but it still 
includes some grey areas, albeit relatively 
small, that go against its own aims. While 
such debates rage, millions of lives will 
continue to be degraded or destroyed 
by corruption on a daily basis, and this 
surely is the ultimate test: how lives will 
be improved. Time will tell.
1 It may also be noted that Germany only ratified UNCAC as 
recently as November 2014. For a full list of signatories see 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.
html.
2 One former chair of the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
likened the difference in media coverage to that between 
plane crashes and road traffic accidents.
3 https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/
session5/V1388054e.pdf. 
4 The select committee reported that: ‘The Ministry of 
Justice departmental report refers to these payments 
as being for things such as “small payments relating 
to the grant of a permit or licence, the provision of 
utility services, or loading or unloading cargo.” The 
Ministry commented that these payments do not yield 
an “undue advantage”, and that measures in the bill 
to ensure the recording of these payments mitigate any 
concerns that the exception may be abused.’ http://www.
parliament.nz/resource/en-nz/51DBSCH_SCR62835_1/
fb244777b2a0130a9317026b2332229ea4408543. 
5 As defined by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, a MiPO 
offence is committed where:
1. a public official; 2. in the course of or in relation to 
his/her public office; 3. wilfully misconducts him/herself; 
by act or omission (for example, by wilfully neglecting 
or failing to perform his/her duty); 4. without reasonable 
excuse or justification; and 5. where such misconduct is 
serious, not trivial, having regard to the responsibilities 
of the office and the office-holder, the importance of 
the public objects which they serve and the nature and 
extent of the departure from those responsibilities.
 The UK definition is similar, but omits the proviso that the 
misconduct must be serious, not trivial.
6 For all Conservative Party donor groups see https://www.
conservatives.com/donate/Donor_Clubs. 
7 https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/
Downloadable%20Files/Donors/LG%20Meals%20Q4%20
2014.ashx.
So Near Yet So Far: implications of the Organised Crime and Anti-corruption Legislation Bill
... one of the explicit ends of the new 
Organised Crime and Anti-corruption 
Legislation Bill is to allow ratification of 
UNCAC, this really should be secondary 
to improving legislation and providing 
international leadership in this area.
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The appropriateness and effectiveness of using restorative 
justice in situations of family violence has long been 
debated. In New Zealand, this debate is no longer 
hypothetical. The decision of the Ministry of Justice in 
2013 to bring family violence within the orbit of restorative 
justice provision, together with changes to s.24a of the 
Sentencing Act in 2014 which make an assessment of 
suitability for restorative justice mandatory in the great 
majority of cases coming before the District Court, 
irrespective of the type of offending involved, mean 
that examination of the proper place of restorative 
interventions in this area is more urgent than ever.
To promote dialogue on the matter, the Diana Unwin 
Chair in Restorative Justice at Victoria University, with 
funding assistance from the New Zealand Law Foundation, 
organised a major conference on Family Violence, the Law 
and Restorative Justice at Parliament on 7 May.  
The conference was opened by the Minister of Justice 
and featured Professor Leigh Goodmark from the 
University of Maryland’s Carey Law School as keynote 
speaker. A specialist on gendered violence, Professor 
Goodmark offered a critique of the direction government 
policy has taken over the past 40 years and explored the 
potential of alternative, community-based approaches, 
such as restorative justice, to address the problem. 
A Summary of Proceedings of the conference is  
available at www.victoria.ac.nz/sog/researchcentres/
chair-in-restorative-justice
Restorative Justice Conference  
Held Recently
Minister of Justice, Amy Adams, opens the conference at Parliament
